Open Access (OER) Ethics Textbook

Here's a new open-access ethics textbook with three essays by, me and me and a co-author, in it.

• "Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing" by Nathan Nobis 
• “Common Arguments about Abortion” and “Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion,” by Nathan Nobis and Kristina Grob, [both chapters]. 

UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION
1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin)
2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba)
3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr)
4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (Noah Levin)
5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge)
6 The Ethics of our Digital Selves (Noah Levin)

UNIT TWO: TORTURE, DEATH, AND THE “GREATER GOOD”
7 The Ethics of Torture (Martine Berenpas)
8 What Moral Obligations do we have (or not have) to Impoverished Peoples? (B.M. Wooldridge)
9 Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing (Nathan Nobis)
10 An Argument Against Capital Punishment (Noah Levin)
11 Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob)
12 Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob)

UNIT THREE: PERSONS, AUTONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND RIGHTS
13 Animal Rights (Eduardo Salazar)
14 John Rawls and the “Veil of Ignorance” (Ben Davies)
15 Environmental Ethics: Climate Change (Jonathan Spelman)
16 Rape, Date Rape, and the “Affirmative Consent” Law in California (Noah Levin)
17 The Ethics of Pornography: Deliberating on a Modern Harm (Eduardo Salazar)
18 The Social Contract (Thomas Hobbes)

UNIT FOUR: HAPPINESS
19 Is Pleasure all that Matters? Thoughts on the “Experience Machine” (Prabhpal Singh)
20 Utilitarianism (J.S. Mill)
21 Utilitarianism: Pros and Cons (B.M. Wooldridge)
22 Existentialism, Genetic Engineering, and the Meaning of Life: The Fifths (Noah Levin)
23 The Solitude of the Self (Elizabeth Cady Stanton)
24 Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Douglas E. Hill)

UNIT FIVE: RELIGION, LAW, AND ABSOLUTE MORALITY
25 The Myth of Gyges and The Crito (Plato)
26 God, Morality, and Religion (Kristin Seemuth Whaley)
27 The Categorical Imperative (Immanuel Kant)
28 The Virtues (Aristotle)
29 Beyond Good and Evil (Friedrich Nietzsche)
30 Other Moral Theories: Subjectivism, Relativism, Emotivism, Intuitionism, etc. (Jan F. Jacko)

https://www.ngefarpress.com/2019/05/introduction-to-ethics-open-educational.html  

A Letter to the Editor on Abortion

A letter to the editor: "Dear Decaturish - Thinking Critically About Abortion"

Two additional readings on the issues:

• An overview of many of the arguments: "Ethics and Abortion" at 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. 
• An argumentative chapter for a forthcoming Oxford University Press textbook: "Early and Later Abortions: Ethics and Law" 

Question-Begging Arguments on Abortion

Many arguments about abortion are bad. Sometimes this is because they “beg the question,” or assume the argument’s conclusion as a premise. Question-begging arguments against abortion assume that abortion is wrong or that fetuses are wrong to kill; question-begging arguments in favor of abortion assume that abortions are not wrong or that fetuses are not wrong to kill. This is circular reasoning and must always be dismissed.

Early and Later Abortions: Ethics and Law

Early and Later Abortions: Ethics and Law

Early Abortions Are Not Wrong, Late Abortions Could Be Wrong,

but probably All Abortions Should Be Legal

Reply to Christopher Tollefsen on Abortion, in Bob Fischer, ed., Ethics, Left and Right: The Moral Issues That Divide Us (Oxford University Press, 2019).

For a reply to the "opposing side" essay, see my (9/26/18) "Reply to Christopher Tollefsen on Abortion"

Note: this chapter led to this short book: Thinking Critically About Abortion at www.AbortionArguments.com

Nathan Nobis; Philosophy, Morehouse College; nathan.nobis@gmail.com

Draft 7/31/18 ; Google doc; Also available at Academia.edu and Dropbox

Abstract

Most abortions occur early in pregnancy. I argue that these abortions, and so most abortions, are not morally wrong and that the best arguments given to think that these abortions are wrong are weak. I also argue that these abortions, and probably all abortions, should be legal.

I begin by observing that people sometimes respond to the issue by describing the circumstances of abortion, not offering reasons for their views about those circumstances; I then dismiss “question-begging” arguments about abortion that merely assume the conclusions they are given to support; most importantly, I evaluate many arguments: both common, often-heard arguments and arguments developed by philosophers.

My defense of abortion is based on facts about early fetuses’ not yet possessing consciousness or any mental life, awareness or feeling, as well as concerns about rights to one’s own body.

A Response to "No monkey business: Chimps don’t have human rights, philosophers say"

In "No monkey business: Chimps don’t have human rights, philosophers say" (Friday, May 11, 2018; "Before It's News" website) the recent case for believing that chimpanzees are persons and so should have legal rights is engaged (see also NhRP). Two philosophy professors are quoted, arguing that chimpanzees are not persons and cannot have rights. Let's think about what they have to say.

Dr. John Crosby, a philosophy professor at Franciscan University of Steubenville in Ohio, is quoted:

“Undeniably, there is something there mysterious [about {chimpanzees}]. There is something of worth, but there is not a person. And therefore, because they are not a person, there are no real rights the chimp has.” 

So why are they not persons? What's the reason or reasons?

Crosby offers this definition of a person:

“A person is a being that possesses himself and is capable of originating action, where he freely determines himself. It’s very difficult to claim that any chimp, however amazingly skilled, is a free agent.”

But many human beings -- e.g., babies, severely mentally challenged persons, and others -- are not free agents, "freely determining themselves," whatever this might mean. (We might wonder if the meaning implies that many animals are free agents, however: doesn't an uncooperative house cat freely determine herself? If so, so do many other animals, including chimps, and so would be persons on this definition). But these human beings are persons, so this definition surely is mistaken: free will, or free agency, is not needed for personhood.  

The page reports (although does not quote) Crosby responding this way to this objection: 

"Babies grow into morally responsible adults and comatose patients may potentially get better. Even if the patient does not get better . . people 'are the kind of being that in the normal instance has moral agency and something is blocking exercise of it.'"

He also argues -- according to the site - that because chimpanzees permanently lack moral culpability, they are not persons.

While Crosby's arguments are quick, a few replies should be given. 

• First, some human beings permanently lack moral culpability, but they are still persons. Some babies don't grow into responsible adults, yet they are persons. (And doctors might even say of some comatose patients that they lack the relevant potential to get better.) So even if it's true that chimpanzees permanently lack moral culpability (which, they might not, given the evidence of their abilities to understand and reason), this isn't a good reason to think that they are not persons. 
• Second, in general, we aren't, and shouldn't, be treated in terms of our potentials: potential doctors, lawyers, judges, parents, spouses, criminals, saints, and on and on are all quite different from actual individuals of these kinds. So, at least, appeals to potential, say, free agency are a doubtful way of grounding personhood. Perhaps it can be done, but the pattern -- that potential things of a kind rarely, if ever, have the rights of actual things of that kind -- suggests that this is not likely to be a fruitful way to ground the personhood of human beings who lack free agency, rationality and other sophisticated mental capacities. So, this doesn't help undercut the case for chimpanzee personhood. 
• Third, recall that Crosby states that people "are the kind of being that in the normal instance has moral agency and something is blocking exercise of it." But rarely, if ever, should individuals be treated as "normal" instances of their "kind," if they are not normal instances of their kind. For example, human beings are bipedal and can see with their eyes -- that is normal for their kind -- but people without legs or who are blind -- because of something "blocking" exercise of the normal capacities -- should be treated in light of their special conditions, not in ways that are "normal" for their "kind." The same is true for "normal" mental and emotional capacities of the kind of beings who are human beings. The points here is that we should be treated as individuals, which might be different from how normal members of our kind should be treated, and so this too is not likely to be a fruitful way to ground the personhood of human beings without "normal" capacities and abilities. So, this response also doesn't help undercut the case for chimpanzee personhood. 
• Finally, it's worthwhile to notice that Crosby's case against chimpanzee personhood seems to imply that human embryos and fetuses are persons, given their potential and what "kind" they are. While some will happily accept this result, others will be surprised and wonder if they must think this in order to argue against chimpanzee rights: to oppose chimpanzee rights, must we also think that abortion is likely wrong? This connection would be, at least for many people, a surprising and unexpected consequence, and so might lead them to at least doubt, if not reject, Crosby's reasoning. 

Again, Crosby's case is quick, but any developed case along his lines would need to engage these concerns.

Finally, the web page concludes with this:

Father Brian Chrzastek, a philosophy professor at the Dominican House of Studies, also reflected on the difference between chimps and people. He said that humans have a higher potential for abstract thought and originality. While animals act by instinct, he said people engage rationally with the world. 

“Humans are different in kind. It’s not like we are just smart chimpanzees or something. We’re an entirely different level of thought, an entirely different kind of species,” he told CNA.

In reply:

• First, while perhaps humans in general have a higher potential for abstract thought and originality -- or perhaps not, since some animals might be capable of even more abstract thought about matters that concern them, and perhaps might be original in ways that don't compare to any human originality -- not all human beings have that potential. 
• Second, again, we shouldn't be treated in terms of our potentials: if I'm not a very abstract thinker and am rather unoriginal in everything I think and do, I shouldn't be treated as someone who excels in original, abstract thought. 
• Third, animals do not merely act "by instinct": this is naive to the best scientific and common-sense understanding of many animals. 
• Fourth, sadly many human people often do not engage rationally with the world: read the daily news. 

And, fifth and finally, while it's true that humans are "different in kind" from animals, we are also the same in kind to many animals, especially chimpanzees: we are conscious, aware, with thoughts, feelings and perceptions, and personalities: we are persons. And persons should have legal rights that protect us against certain types of harms and wrongdoing, whatever species the person is.

Note: This paper is based on arguments I developed in greater detail in “Tom Regan on ‘Kind’ Arguments against Animal Rights and for Human Rights” in The Moral Rights of Animals, edited by Mylan Engel and Gary Comstock (Lexington Books, 2016).

Posted by the Nonhuman Rights Project: https://www.facebook.com/NonhumanRights/?hc_ref=ARRsuPnUm5zB-Bj6Fsm8n8dkEmXLebb2vC9ZgLzHRlsMTav1zIprx8h3yHbSKsszz8E&fref=nf 

Also here with better formatting. 

Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers' Brief

I contributed to this article and project. - Nathan

THE STONE

Should Chimpanzees Be Considered ‘Persons’?

Image

CreditIllustration by Najeebah Al-Ghadban; Photograph by Entienou, via Getty Images

Chimpanzee Personhood

I made some small contributions the legal document here arguing that chimpanzees should be considered persons, not things:

"Philosophers Offer Support For Chimpanzee Rights Cases"

Repost

An essay of mine on abortion and animal ethics was reposted on Animal People Forum:  

Abortion and Animal Rights: Does Either Topic Lead to the Other?

Carl Cohen's 'kind' arguments FOR animal rights and AGAINST human rights

I wrote this article in 2004:

"Carl Cohen's ‘kind’arguments FOR animal rights and AGAINST human rights." Journal of applied philosophy 21.1 (2004): 43-59.

An updated discussion of similar issues is available here:

"Tom Regan on ‘Kind’ Arguments Against Animal Rights and For Human Rights," in The Moral Rights of Animals, ed. Engel and Comstock (Lexington, 2016).

Full paper below:

On the "What's Wrong?" Blog: Abortion and Animal Rights - Animal Rights and Abortion

What’s Wrong With Linking Abortion and Animal Rights?

Posted on July 16, 2016 | Leave a comment

Nathan Nobis, an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, kindly contributed the following piece to What’s Wrong?  Professor Nobis is the author of many articles and book chapters on topics concerning ethics and animals (e.g., vegetarianism, experimentation) and the ethics of abortion, an unpublished 2003 essay on the relations between these topics, and a review of a recent book on these topics’ intersections, which inspired this essay.  What’s Wrong? is grateful to Professor Nobis for permission to publish this original piece here.

Summary:

Should your views on abortion influence your views on animal rights? Should your views on the moral status of animals influence your views on the moral status of human fetuses?

Generally, no. Most arguments against abortion have no implications for animal rights and those that might seem to be poor arguments against abortion. And arguments for animal rights only have implications for rare, later abortions of conscious fetuses, not the majority of abortions that affect early, pre-conscious fetuses.

On the other sides, though, a common of objection to animal rights does support a pro-life view and an influential feminist pro-choice argument does suggest positive implications for animals, though.

Overall, the topic of abortion presents with an inherent complexity never analogously present in animal rights issues – the perspective of the pregnant woman whose life and body the fetus depends on – and so the issues are importantly distinct. 

Book Review: Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights

SHERRY F. COLB AND MICHAEL C. DORF

Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights

Sherry F. Colb and Michael C. Dorf, Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights, Columbia University Press, 2016, 252pp., $35.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780231175142.

Reviewed byNathan Nobis, Morehouse College

http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/67959-beating-hearts-abortion-and-animal-rights/ 

800 Words on Ethics and Abortion

800 words on abortion, for The Philosophers' Magazine, Issue 72 on "50 New Thoughts in Philosophy":

ABORTION

Nathan Nobis is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA USA, and author of many articles on topics in bioethics, including abortion.

Abortion involves killing a fetus to end a pregnancy. These fetuses are human, biologically, and are beings. So, abortion involves the killing of a human being, which is usually wrong. So is abortion wrong?  

Review of a book on Race and Pharmaceutical Development

http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/xgDU9iEQz639dih5DJaw/full 

The American Journal of Bioethics Volume 15, Issue 10, 2015

Book Review

Review of Jonathan Kahn, Race in a Bottle: The Story of BiDil and Racialized Medicine in the Post-Genomic Age¹

Full text HTML

PDF

Full access

DOI:

10.1080/15265161.2015.1067339

Nathan Nobis^a*

pages W4-W5

Publishing models and article dates explained

• Published online: 19 Oct 2015

New Book Review

Review of Jonathan Kahn, Race in a Bottle: The Story of BiDil and Racialized Medicine in the Post-Genomic Age

Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life

Robert P. George (Princeton)'s views about marriage have gotten a lot of attention lately. A simple statement of his view is that that marriage is the "kind" of relationship that results in children: since same-sex relationships cannot ("naturally") result in children, he claims they can't be, or shouldn't be considered, marriage. Of course, many opposite-sex marriages do not and cannot result in children, yet they are marriages, so this view seems to have a problem. See this informative and entertaining video by John Corvino that discusses these arguments.

George's views about embryo research (and abortion) appeal to the same kind of "kind" argument: embryos are the "kind" of being that has a "rational nature." Yet embryo's are not rational, or not yet rational, and so this view seems problematic also. Years ago I wrote this paper discussing George's arguments. I re-post it here in case reading it would improve discussion of each "kind" argument, about embryo research and marriage:

Critical Study of Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life

Abstract: In Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (Doubleday, 2008), Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen argue that human embryo-destructive experimentation is morally wrong and should not be supported with state funds. I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful.

I never really tried to publish this paper because I found this book a few years after it was published and so by that point I thought there wouldn't be much interest in a longer critical review anywhere.

For discussion of similar arguments, see my "Abortion, Metaphysics and Morality: A Review of Francis Beckwith’s Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice."

Full paper below:

Considering Law School?

I recently read this excellent short book Don't Go To Law School (Unless): A Law Professor's Inside Guide to Maximizing Opportunity and Minimizing Risk by Paul Campos. The book is based on his blog, and I highly recommend it for anyone considering law school or, for whatever reason, is interested in the legal and legal education industry. For many people, there are few better ways they could invest $5! The book's contents are also freely available in this really cool flow chart format too. 

Family Law and Shared Parenting Presumptions

This summer I've developed a scholarly interest in an area of family law known as "shared parenting presumptions." The issue is this: if parents* divorce and have children, what is the most fair and just custody arrangement for the children?

Advocates of shared parenting presumptions argue that we should presume from the outset that the child(ren) will share their time with each parent roughly equally: this is an initial position of fairness and justice, and respects parents' rights to their children and children's rights to their parents.

Of course, there might be, and often are, good reasons why equality this would not be the most fair and just (or desired, by all parties) arrangement, but a presumption can accommodate that: we can, and should, deviate from equality when there are good reasons to do so, when strong evidence has been presented that equality is not most fair and just, given the facts of the case.

In most states, there is at least an informal presumption against equality, and there are barriers to seeking it. The working presumption often is that the child(ren) will spend most of their time with one parent and so spend "every other weekend and one night a week" with the non-custodial parent. A parent who seeks equality typically has argue for equality, often at considerable costs, financial and emotional.

The issue can be seen in terms of a "burden of proof": should the burden of proof be on those who seek equality, or the burden of proof be on those who oppose equality? Since equality is, from a starting point, fair and just, we should start there, so argue advocates of shared parenting.

There are many issues here: legal issues, social science about child development, and concerns about gender stereotypes. And they are couched in basic moral or ethical about justice and fairness, and the goods of parent-child relationships, and mediating conflict.

If anyone, especially in Georgia (since these issues are state-specific) is interested in these issues, I'd appreciate hearing from you since there is a lot to learn here. I anticipate writing something on these issues soon enough. For more on the legal issues, see this post "Joint Legal Custody is Your Constitutional Right."

* My discussion above concerns a male-female married couple. These issues are likely more complicated if the couple is not married, the couple is of the same sex, the child is adopted, paternity is not established or is in dispute and so on.