There's a topic in philosophy about whether there are moral experts or ethics experts. I think there are such things, since some people have much more developed skills at thinking about ethical issues due to having had specific training in doing just that.
But expertise is a relative thing: some people have greater expertise than others.
I am unsure, at the moment, however, whether the academic discussion compares philosophers to literally random people, who seem to often do a very terrible job at ethical reasoning: often they just state their views--without any reasons; they give reasons that are question-begging; they know very little about the most important arguments, etc. In short, they are highly underinformed and highly unskilled at thinking about controversial, complex ethical issues. Does the literature address this?
Yes—this issue is very much on the radar in the literature, and your intuition is basically right: a lot of the serious discussion already assumes (or explicitly argues) that comparison class matters. The debate is not always “philosophers vs. random people,” but when it is, the results are often more favorable to your view than critics of moral expertise sometimes suggest.
Here’s how the landscape breaks down.
1. The classic debate: are there moral experts at all?
The modern discussion is often framed by:
- John Rawls → allows for expertise in moral reasoning (reflective equilibrium), but is cautious about authority over others
- Peter Singer → more comfortable with the idea that careful reasoning can lead to better moral judgments
- David Enoch → skeptical that philosophers have special authority
- Alison Hills → argues for moral understanding as a kind of expertise
A key distinction that emerges:
- Expertise in reasoning vs.
- Expertise in knowing what’s right
Many philosophers accept the first and resist the second.
2. Your point: the comparison class problem
You’re putting your finger on a major issue:
Are we comparing philosophers to other trained reasoners or to untrained, often careless reasoners?
The literature does address this, though sometimes indirectly.
(a) Experimental philosophy (x-phi)
Work by people like:
- Joshua Knobe
- Shaun Nichols
compares philosophers and non-philosophers on intuitions.
Finding: philosophers often show similar intuitions to non-philosophers.
Critics (your side):
- This uses thin tasks (quick judgments, no time for reasoning)
-
It ignores what philosophers are actually trained to do:
→ analyze arguments, detect fallacies, revise views
So yes—the critique you’re making is explicitly raised in that literature.
(b) The “debunking” of moral expertise
Some argue:
Philosophers disagree a lot → therefore no expertise.
But others respond:
- David Christensen (on disagreement)
- Thomas Kelly
Disagreement doesn’t eliminate expertise unless:
- Disagreement is systematic and irresolvable among equally informed agents
And importantly:
Disagreement among experts is very different from disagreement between experts and poorly informed non-experts.
This supports your point: the relevant comparison group matters.
3. Direct defenses of moral expertise (closer to your view)
Several philosophers argue something like what you’re saying:
(a) Expertise as skill in reasoning
-
Alison Hills
→ moral understanding involves:- recognizing relevant reasons
- weighing them appropriately
- explaining them
This is clearly trainable and unevenly distributed.
(b) Novices vs. trained reasoners
- Julia Driver
- Karen Jones
They emphasize that:
- Moral competence varies
- Some people are bad at moral reasoning in systematic ways
This is very much your point: many people:
- Give question-begging arguments
- Ignore counterevidence
- Lack conceptual clarity
(c) Practical analogy arguments
Often used by:
- Peter Singer
Analogy:
We trust experts in medicine, law, science—why not ethics?
Critics say ethics is different, but defenders reply:
The difference is overstated—ethical reasoning also involves evidence, argument, and error-correction.
4. Your exact concern: do philosophers compare themselves to “random people”?
Short answer: sometimes yes, but that’s increasingly recognized as a weak comparison.
More careful versions of the debate distinguish:
- Philosophers vs. laypeople (untrained)
- Philosophers vs. other highly trained thinkers (e.g., lawyers, scientists)
- Better vs. worse reasoners within any group
And many now think:
The strongest case for moral expertise is not that philosophers are uniquely authoritative, but that training improves performance relative to untrained reasoning.
5. A more precise way to frame your view (and the literature)
What you seem to be defending is something like:
There is graded, skill-based expertise in moral reasoning, and many ordinary people perform quite poorly at it due to lack of training, information, and intellectual virtues.
That position is:
- Widely defensible
- Increasingly common
Even many skeptics about “moral experts” would accept:
-
People differ in:
- logical skill
- familiarity with arguments
- ability to avoid fallacies
- These differences matter for moral reasoning
6. Where the real disagreement now lies
The live philosophical dispute is less about whether skills differ and more about:
- Do these skills lead to more accurate moral beliefs?
- Should we defer to those with better skills?
- Is moral truth the kind of thing that allows expertise?
Bottom line
Yes—the literature does address your concern, and your intuition tracks a major fault line:
- Early or simplistic critiques of moral expertise often rely on weak comparisons (philosophers vs. minimally reflective subjects)
-
More sophisticated work recognizes:
- variation in moral reasoning skill
- the importance of training and information
- the inadequacy of “random person” comparisons
If you wanted to press your point in print, a strong formulation would be:
Arguments against moral expertise often underestimate how poorly untrained agents reason about ethics, and thus fail to use an appropriate baseline for evaluating the effects of philosophical training.
That’s a live, respectable position in the field.
