For my current writings, please see my Academia.edu page:


Many of my publications are also available at Academia.eduGoogle Scholar PhilPapers and PubMed. If the link below doesn't work, just Google the title or email me, please. 

Google Scholar profile:  

My writing and research areas are broad. Most of them are in areas of "applied" philosophy, especially practical ethics. I am also currently engaged in a number of collaborate research projects with medical researchers, medical and mental health care providers, social scientists and legal scholars. 

Some recent publications (8/6/16):

Below are some papers, but this all needs to be redone; again, please see my Academia.edu page.  

  • "Rational Engagement, Emotional Response and the Prospects for Progress in Animal Use 'Debates'" in Jeremy Garrett, ed., Animal Research in Theory and Practice (MIT Basic Bioethics Series, 2012), pp. 237-265. Draft of an APPENDIX that addresses more arguments that couldn't be addressed in the chapter. 
  • "What would be so bad about rejecting libertarian 'free will'?" De Philosophia, Vol. XVI, No. 2, 21-34, 2002.
  • Discussion with the "On the Human" project of the National Humanities Center.  
On March 5, 2010, I created a survey to try to identify which topics are most commonly addressed in introductory ethics courses that have a contemporary moral issues or problems component. If (and only if) you teach a course that focuses on practical issues (with little to no discussion of moral theory) or has a mix of theory and problems (either a unit on theory and then problems or a mix of theory and problems throughout), please fill out this survey below: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/ethics-course-survey  Results have been posted here, since I closed the survey:

I am currently at work on a (text)book entitled Making Moral Progress: A Moral Arguments WorkbookThis book evaluates moral arguments using basic formal logic and starts with common arguments, what ordinary people often say about the issues, before moving on to arguments from developed by philosophers. The book will be useful for a variety of audiences and contexts. 

Synopsis: I argue that common reasons to think that no moral judgments are true suggest that epistemic judgments, e.g., that some belief is rational, justified or should be held, are not true either. I argue that these epistemic anti-realisms are rationally unacceptable and that the major premises that entail them are false. Thus, I undercut the case against moral realism, which rests on these premises.