On the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals and Vulnerable Human Beings
Abstract: What do the reasons given for and against various moral views about many non-human animals imply or suggest for moral views about human beings in all their varieties, especially “vulnerable” human beings? And what do the reasons given for and against various moral views about the variety of human beings imply or suggest for our moral views about many animals? Some people are offended by some of these claims and arguments, but which are genuinely offensive? These and related questions are discussed and answered here.
2. Moral Epistemologies for Animals 2
2.2. Arguments from Non-Species-Specific Properties 3
2.2.1. The Argument for Animal Rights 4
2.2.2. The Argument against Animal Rights 5
2.3. Arguments from Animals’ Relations to Human Beings 6
2.3.1. Arguments from Human Beings “In General” 6
2.3.2. Arguments from All Human Beings 8
2.3.2.1. Is the Argument Offensive? 10
2.3.2.2. A Dangerous Argument? 10
2.3.2.3. An Unsound Argument? 14
3. Moral Epistemologies for Human Beings 18
3.2. Arguments from Non-Species-Specific Principles 18
3.3. Rationality-Requiring Theories of Rights 18
3.4. Theories of Rights based on Relations to (Rational) Human Beings 18
3.5. From Animal Rights to Human Rights 19
4. Conclusions: What Should We Think? What Should We Do? 19
4.2. Human-Rights Advocates 20
4.3. Foes of Human and Animal Rights 21
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