Also here.
Author: Nathan Nobis
Categories: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion
Word count: 992
Editors’ note: this is our second essay published on the divine command theory. The first is Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory by Spencer Case. We hope readers will appreciate multiple presentations on this theory.
Some people claim that ethics depends on God: unless there’s a God who makes actions right and wrong, no actions would be objectively right or wrong, good or bad.[1]
Such people often accept the Divine Command Theory of ethics (hereafter, DCT). According to DCT, wrong actions are wrong because God forbids them and right actions are right because God commands them.
This essay introduces this ethical theory and the most important responses to it, which date back to Socrates’ discussion in ancient Greece with a man named Euthyphro.
1. Common Misunderstandings
To begin, let’s clarify what DCT is not.
First, DCT is not an appeal to the Ten Commandments, the Bible, or any other religious text.[2] The idea of “God’s commands” here is what God requires or forbids, not what any text claims this is. God’s commands are in “God’s mind,” so to speak: they need not be the same as anything anyone claims to be records of these commands. DCT proposes that right and wrong depend on what God actually commands or forbids, not on the accuracy or even existence of any records of those commands.
If there weren’t any records of God’s commands, how might anyone know what they are? Strictly speaking, DCT itself doesn’t address how, or even whether, God makes his commands known. Its advocates could even claim that nobody knows which particular actions are right and wrong: they just think that, whatever those actions are, they are made right or wrong by God’s commands. More likely though, DCT advocates might say that God gives us reason and a conscience to help identify what his commands are.
It’s worthwhile to understand that if someone claims that they believe some specific action is wrong because they accept DCT, they are accepting a claim that is, strictly speaking, not part of DCT itself.[3] DCT isn’t a theory about which particular actions are wrong and right, since by itself it makes no claims about what God specifically commands: it is a general explanation of what makes wrong actions wrong and right actions right, i.e., an ethical theory.
Finally, while some think that only theists might accept DCT, some non-theists accept it: some claim that objective ethics could exist only if there’s a God who commands us to act in various ways. Since such people don’t think God exists, they conclude that ethics doesn’t exist: no actions are right or wrong.[4]
2. Reasons
The question then is whether we should agree with anyone who claims that ethics depends on God’s commands. While DCT is popular in some circles, few academic philosophers accept it, even philosophers who believe in God.[5]
To understand why, we might consider some moral judgments that most people are extremely confident in—e.g., that slavery, school shootings, and cheating on one’s spouse are wrong. Here’s an important question:
if God commands us to not do these actions, why would God do that?
Here’s a dilemma:
either there are reasons or not.
Many people think there would be reasons: actions like these are harmful, disrespectful, and unfair; that’s likely why God would condemn them.[6]
But this type of explanation entails that DCT is false: wrong actions are not wrong because God commands them: they are wrong for reasons that don’t depend on God’s commands.
Socrates is often interpreted as asking Euthyphro a related question:
would God command us to not do wrong actions because they are wrong, or would wrong actions be wrong because God commands us to not do them?[7]
This type of question is called the “Euthyphro dilemma.” To believe that God would condemn wrong actions because they are wrong—and wrong perhaps for reasons such as those above—is to reject DCT.
3. No Reasons
Suppose someone thinks there’d be no reason why God would command us to not be school shooters. Suppose someone thinks wrong actions are wrong solely because God commands them, as DCT proposes.
To many, these suggest that God’s commands are arbitrary or random—they “could have gone any other way”—and so God could have commanded people to be school shooters. These also suggest that anything God commanded would be right: so, if God commanded school shootings, then—according to DCT—they would be right.[8]
To many, these implications seem implausible, perhaps impossible, and so they conclude the DCT is mistaken.[9]
4. God’s Character
Some respond that an all-good, all-loving being like God would not or could not command such an action.[10] But that is likely to again reject DCT in favor of thinking that some actions are just wrong, pretty much no matter what: that’s why God could not or would not command them.[11]
Some deeper questions: why would God have a loving character rather than a “hating” character? Why would a loving being command some actions and not others? Again:
either there are reasons or not.[12]
If there are no reasons, then God’s being loving is arbitrary—God could have had an evil character. To many, this isn’t plausible.
But if there are reasons, is it because it is just good to be loving—perhaps because being loving promotes happiness, respect, and fairness? If so, then some things are good and bad, or right and wrong independently of God’s commands: so DCT is false.
5. Conclusion
Some accept DCT because they are unaware of better ethical theories.[13] And some might argue that if God created everything, then God created morality. But perhaps not everything is created: e.g., mathematical truths are often taken to be necessary truths—true eternally, and true no matter what the world had been like—and not created, even by God.[14]
If moral truths are like mathematical truths—e.g., if “sexual assaults are inherently wrong” is eternally and universally true, just like a triangle always has three sides—then morality would not depend on divine commands, even if God exists. This would not show that God is irrelevant to morality; but it would show only that God’s commands are not what make actions right or wrong.
Notes
[1] The language of actions being “objectively” wrong and right here is used, in part, because it is common. A common understanding of what “objectively” wrong actions are is that they are wrong regardless of what anyone believes them: e.g., kicking babies for fun would be wrong even if (somehow!) everyone believed doing that was right.
While this is understandable, it’s good to ask what any contrary or opposite of “objectively” wrong actions might be: non-objectively wrong? “Subjectively” wrong?
But what would either of these be? People believing or perhaps feeling that some actions are wrong, yet no such beliefs are true or correct?
If there is not a good contrast or opposite to “objectively” wrong and right, then it might be better just to speak of just pain right and wrong, without the “objective” For related discussion, see “That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness by Nathan Nobis and Moral Error Theory: Are there Moral Facts? by Ian Tully, and Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong? by Nathan Nobis.
[2] Simple ethical arguments from the Bible tend to appeal to these (often unstated) premises:
if the Bible commands us to do an action, then it would be morally wrong to not do the action: the action is a moral obligation: and:
if the Bible commands us to not do an action, then the action is morally wrong.
(An arguments, see Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe? by Thomas Metcalf; on this specific form of argument, see Contemporary Syllogisms by Timothy Eshing).
Such premises, however, appear to be subject to counterexamples that show them to be false, some wrong actions that are denied to be wrong and some said to be wrong actions that are not wrong. Here are some morally wrong actions the Bible seems to command:
Leviticus 20:10 commands death for adultery: “If a man commits adultery with another man’s wife—both the adulterer and the adulteress are to be put to death.”
Deuteronomy 20:16–17 explicitly commands genocide: “Do not leave alive anything that breathes” in certain cities.
Exodus 21:20–21 permits beating slaves as long as they survive: “Anyone who beats their male or female slave… must be punished if the slave dies as a direct result, but not if the slave recovers.”
1 Peter 2:18 commands slaves to obey harsh masters: “Submit yourselves to your masters, not only to those who are good and considerate, but also to those who are harsh.”
Romans 13:1–2 commands submission to all governing authorities, including unjust ones: “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities… whoever rebels is rebelling against what God has instituted.”
And here are some actions that are not morally wrong but the Bible forbids or severely punishes:
Numbers 15:32–36 commands execution for gathering wood on the Sabbath, a not wrong action: “The man must be put to death; the whole assembly must stone him outside the camp.”
Deuteronomy 21:18–21 commands execution for a rebellious son who disobeys his parents: “All the men of the town are to stone him to death.”
Acts 5:1–11 recounts Ananias and Sapphira being struck dead for lying about donations, an extreme punishment for dishonesty.
1 Timothy 2:12 forbids women from teaching or having authority over men: “I do not permit a woman to teach or to assume authority over a man; she must be quiet.”
So, it seems that just because the Bible forbids an action doesn’t mean it’s wrong; just because the Bible commands an action doesn’t mean it’s right, and so arguments that depend on the initial premises—if the Bible commands us to do an action, then it would be morally wrong to not do the action; and if the Bible commands us to not do an action, then the action is morally wrong—are unsound. It’s important to understand that one can acknowledge this and believe that the Bible contains great moral wisdom.
But on the general theme of this essay: just because someone—or any text—commands anything doesn’t always mean we should accept or obey that command: either there are (good) reasons to accept that command or not. If there are good reasons, then we should obey the command because of those good reasons. But if there are not good reasons to justify the command, then perhaps we need not obey it.
[3] It’s worth observing that appeals to what God commands are not apt to be persuasive to people who do not believe there’s a God or do not believe that God commanded whatever is being said to be commanded. This, however, does not entail that such claims are false: just because some people claim God didn’t command something doesn’t entail God didn’t command that or that people are not obligated to obey that command. That (some) people are unpersuaded by some claim does not entail that claim is false or that it does not apply to them: e.g., some people reject the claim that racial discrimination is wrong, but that does not entail that racial discrimination is not wrong or that it’s morally permissible for such a person to engage in racial discrimination.
[4] For example, atheist philosopher J.L. Mackie claimed that the idea of a moral fact or truth is that of something that only a divine lawmaker or God would make: see Moral Error Theory: Are There Moral Facts? by Ian Tully. Nietzsche said similarly: see “God is dead”: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Death of God by Justin Remhof. Theistic philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe had a similar claim: see G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” by Daniel Weltman. Of course, the question is whether any such claim is correct and whether there are good reasons to accept it. For further discussion on the relations between the varieties of non-theisms and ethics, see Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist by Nathan Nobis.
DCT can also be appealed to develop a version of what’s often called a moral argument for God’s existence: (1) some actions are right and other actions are wrong; (2) these actions are made right and wrong because of God’s commands; therefore, God exists. A theme of this essay is that premise (2) here appears to be false.
[5] For instance, many of the objections to DCT presented in this essay are standard objections that are presented in most philosophical ethics textbooks. Although it’s not easy to get reliable data on the frequency that philosophers accept different views, in the results of the 2020 PhilPapers survey, for neither of the main questions about which ethical theory or meta-ethical theory, the divine command theory, or even theism, is mentioned as an option or proposed as an alternative view: see the responses to (PhilPapers, 2020) “Normative ethics: deontology, virtue ethics, or consequentialism?” and (PhilPapers, 2020) “Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?”
[6] Some of the most historically influential ethical theories or answers to the question, “What makes wrong actions wrong?” appeal to harm, disrespect, and unfairness: see Consequentialism and Utilitarianism by Shane Gronholz, Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics by Andrew Chapman, and John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ by Ben Davies.
[7] See the Euthyphro dialogue, which is widely available, including in Plato (1997 [380 BC]). Socrates’ discussion with Euthyphro was not directly about ethics, however; it focused on what is “pious” or “holy.” Their central question was whether the gods think something is pious because it is pious, or whether it is pious because the gods approve of it. Although the topic was piety, the insights from their exchange are routinely applied to broader questions about what makes actions right or wrong.
[8] For further discussion of God potentially commanding terrible actions, see Morriston (2009).
[9] It is fair to ask why people think that a being like God—or an all-good, loving being—would not or could not command slavery, school shootings, and cheating on one’s spouse. One answer is that we have very strong reasons to believe that these actions are wrong: there are many very good reasons why these actions are wrong (in all or nearly all possible circumstances: they are what’s called prima facie wrong), and no good reasons to think these actions are not wrong. Indeed, these reasons are so strong—indeed we might think we know that actions like these are wrong—that we think that an all-good being like God could not or would not command any actions like these.
[10] This is related to the “modified” version of DCT proposed by Adams (1987), that the commands of a loving God are what makes actions right and wrong, and this being loving would preclude, say, commanding school shootings and other actions that an all-loving being couldn’t command or approve of.
[11] Indeed, perhaps it’s impossible for an all-good being to command wrongdoing, since doing that would be wrong. Being “omnipotent” or all-powerful is usually not understood to be able to do anything but to be able to do anything logically or metaphysically possible; and being all-loving constrains those possibilities. See The Concept of God: Divine Attributes by Bailie Peterson for a discussion of omnipotence and its relation to other divine attributes, including understanding God to be all-good. Understanding what’s meant by “possible” and “impossible” here is key: see Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality by Andre Leo Rusavuk.
[12] Such a dilemma may be related to the “principle of sufficient reason,” a principle that there’s some reason for every fact; nothing happens or is the case for no reason: see Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason by Marc Bobro. Such a dilemma can be extended to any claims believed on the basis of testimony or what someone else tells you: either there’s a good reason to believe what the person says or not: if there is, that good reason is ultimately why you should accept the testimony, not just because someone tells you it. For discussion of how testimony and appeals to what authorities claim can provide good reason or justification for our beliefs, see Take My Word for It: On Testimony by Spencer Case. Moral Testimony by Annaleigh Curtis, and Expertise: What is an Expert? by Jamie Carlin Watson.
[13] It is not uncommon for some types of DCT advocates to claim or assume that the only explanations for what makes actions wrong are either cultural relativism or individual subjectivism—cultural or individual approval—or DCT. This is false, however, and ignores the history of ethical thought and the many influential ethical theories, such as those mentioned in note 6 above. For introductions to common ethical relativisms and subjectivisms, see Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong? and “That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness both by Nathan Nobis.
[14] On the concept of what are called “necessary truths”—propositions that are true in all possible worlds, and so also at all times—and how we might know them, see Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality by Andre Leo Rusavuk and Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity by Bob Fischer.
Another not uncommon claim is that “laws require a lawmaker,” and so moral laws (or truths; perhaps necessary truths?) require that someone “make” them (and this someone would be God). While some laws require a lawmaker—e.g., the civil and criminal laws of a country—many laws do not: e.g., scientific laws don’t appear to need a lawmaker and neither do any what are often called “normative” laws of reasoning, such that if some conclusion logically follows from some premises that you should accept, then you should accept that conclusion: this type of “law” does not appear to require a lawmaker. However, if there were some ethical “lawmaker,” then there would either be reasons why that lawmaker would “make” the laws he does, and not contrary, opposite laws, or no reason, and the main points developed in this essay would apply to that dilemma. For an introductory discussion of what “normative” truths or facts—e.g., about what should and should not be thought and done—might be like, see Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism by Thomas Metcalf.
References
PhilPapers Survey. 2020. “Normative Ethics: Deontology, Virtue Ethics, or Consequentialism?”
PhilPapers Survey. 2020. “Meta-ethics: Moral Realism or Moral Anti-realism?”
For Further Reading
Austin, Michael. “Divine Command Theory.” In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Related Essays
Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory by Spencer Case
“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness by Nathan Nobis
Moral Error Theory: Are there Moral Facts? by Ian Tully
Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong? by Nathan Nobis.
The Concept of God: Divine Attributes by Bailie Peterson
Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe? by Thomas Metcalf
Contemporary Syllogisms by Timothy Eshing
G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” by Daniel Weltman
“God is dead”: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Death of God by Justin Remhof
Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist by Nathan Nobis
Consequentialism and Utilitarianism by Shane Gronholz
Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics by Andrew Chapman
John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ by Ben Davies
Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason by Marc Bobro
Take My Word for It: On Testimony by Spencer Case
Moral Testimony by Annaleigh Curtis
Expertise: What is an Expert? by Jamie Carlin Watson
Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism by Thomas Metcalf
About the Author
Nathan Nobis is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is co-author of Thinking Critically About Abortion, author of Animals & Ethics 101, and the author and co-author of many other writings and materials in philosophy and ethics. NathanNobis.com
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