Moral
Realism
Versus
Moral
Anti-Realism (or Irrealism)
Moral Anti-Realisms:
-
Moral judgments are neither true nor false.
(emotivisms; prescriptivism), or
-
(Positive) Moral judgments are false,
because there are no moral facts or properties to make them true. (error theory; fictionalism)
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versus
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Moral Realisms:
-
Some moral judgments are true.
o
Naturalism: Judgements are made true by “natural” facts. Moral
properties are “natural”
properties: an ethical science.
o
Non-naturalism: Moral properties are “non-natural” properties: no
ethical science without an ethical intuition.
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Meta-ethics: philosophical inquiry about the nature of moral
or ethical judgments (more below).
But what is ethics or morality?
But what is ethics or morality?
Ethics (or Morality):
-
Actions being morally wrong, not wrong
(permissible), obligatory:
o
Example: “The police killing innocent people is
wrong.”
-
“Status of Affairs” being good or bad:
o
Examples: “Pleasure is good.”
-
People being good and bad (virtuous and vicious);
o
Examples: “Being kind and compassionate is
virtuous.”
-
Societies being just or unjust; decisions fair or
unfair.
o
Examples: “Preventing adults from voting is
unjust and unfair.”
Questions:
Meta-ethics: philosophical inquiry about the nature of moral judgments:
- Are any of these claims true?
- If a claim is true, that is usually because of facts that make it true. Alternative, a claim is true because of properties: e.g., it is true that 'the table is made of wood' because the table has the property 'being made of wood,' or this is a fact.
- So what would a moral facts be? What would moral properties be?
- What kind of facts would moral facts be? What kind of properties are moral properties?
Meta-ethics: philosophical inquiry about the nature of moral judgments:
-
Philosophy of Language and Ethics:
o
Is the claim true or false? Neither true nor
false?
-
Philosophy of Mind and Ethics:
o
Is the state of mind belief or/and desire?
-
Metaphysics and Ethics:
o
Are there moral facts? Moral truth-makers?
-
Epistemology and Ethics:
o
Is there moral knowledge? Reasonable or rational
moral beliefs (?)?
Some motivations from Hume:
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ’tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ’tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind
AJ Ayer, an emotivist:
-
Motivating concern: logical positivism.
-
1. A
judgments is meaningful (true or false) only if it is either analytic or
empirically verifiable.
-
2. Moral judgments are neither analytic nor
empirically verifiable.
-
3. Therefore, moral judgments are not
meaningful, are neither true nor false.
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-
Objections to realisms:
Objections to realisms:
o
naturalism and open question argument, following
Moore: “This action produces the most
pleasure, but is it a moral obligation?” Meanings are different, so different
properties??
o
non-naturalism and epistemological puzzlement. “Pleasure
is good???”
Charles Stevenson, an emotivist:
-
Motivating concerns:
o
The “magnetism” of moral judgments.
-
4. Moral judgments are necessarily
motivating.
-
5. Any ‘judgement’
that necessarily motivates is not a belief. (Desires motivate, beliefs do not).
-
6. Therefore, moral judgments are not
beliefs.
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o
Metaphysical puzzlement:
§ What would a moral fact be like? How could
something make an action wrong?
RM Hare, a “universal prescriptivist”:
-
Motivating concerns:
o
Motivational Internalism: (See Stevenson).
o
Objections to realisms:
·
naturalism and open question argument;
·
non-naturalism and epistemological puzzlement.
§ Yet,
thought that there are “rational” constraints on moral judgments.
JL Mackie, an “error theorist,” meaning, all (positive) moral judgments are false:
-
Motivating concerns:
o
The “queerness” of moral judgments: “motivational
internalism”, again. (See Stevenson)
§ Moral
disagreements.
7. There is widespread disagreement about whether various
actions are wrong or not: there is moral disagreement.
8. The best explanation
of this disagreement implies that there are no moral facts.
(If
there were moral facts, then there would be less disagreement, because more
people would see these facts).
9.
Therefore, there are likely no moral facts.
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-
Gilbert Harman (called himself a relativist; seems
like his concern better supports an error theory):
o
Motivating concerns:
§ Moral Disagreements.
§ “Moral
Explanations:
10. We should believe that a property exists only if it
helps us explain observable phenomena.
11. Moral properties don’t help explain observable
phenomena.
Ex. Was slavery eventually
widely opposed because of its injustice
or moral wrongness, or can we
explain why people opposed slavery without positing moral properties (e.g.,
they opposed it just because of their beliefs and attitudes..)?
12. Therefore, we should not believe that moral properties
exist
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§
---
Those were some arguments for anti-realisms.
Here are some other arguments on the issues:
1. If epistemic or intellectual realisms are true, then moral realisms are true. (E.g., if claims about what you should believe, that you should have evidence for your beliefs, that some beliefs shouldn't be accepted, etc.), then moral claims are true also: why not?!).
2. Epistemic or intellectual realisms are true.
3. Therefore, moral realisms are true.
OR
1. If moral realisms are false (for these reasons A, B, C, and D), then epistemic realisms are false too (for these reasons A, B, C, and D). (E.g., if claims about what you morally should do are false, then claims about how you epistemically ought to believe, how you should reason, etc. are false).
2. But epistemic realisms are not false. (And how could it be that you should believe that such should-claims are false?!)
3. So moral realisms are not false (for these reasons A, B, C, and D).
The above was Dr. Nobis's doctoral dissertation, in 2004.
Here are some other arguments on the issues:
1. If epistemic or intellectual realisms are true, then moral realisms are true. (E.g., if claims about what you should believe, that you should have evidence for your beliefs, that some beliefs shouldn't be accepted, etc.), then moral claims are true also: why not?!).
2. Epistemic or intellectual realisms are true.
3. Therefore, moral realisms are true.
OR
1. If moral realisms are false (for these reasons A, B, C, and D), then epistemic realisms are false too (for these reasons A, B, C, and D). (E.g., if claims about what you morally should do are false, then claims about how you epistemically ought to believe, how you should reason, etc. are false).
2. But epistemic realisms are not false. (And how could it be that you should believe that such should-claims are false?!)
3. So moral realisms are not false (for these reasons A, B, C, and D).
The above was Dr. Nobis's doctoral dissertation, in 2004.
An aesthetic connection:
If moral realism is true, then aesthetic realism is true.
Moral realism is true.
So aesthetic realism is true.
Louise Hanson, "Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim," Ethics 129, no. 1 (October 2018): 39-69.
Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim*
Louise Hanson
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