tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26671952.post1898084175846953824..comments2024-02-03T07:10:03.389-05:00Comments on Nathan Nobis, Ph.D. - Philosophy Professor and More: A Response to "No monkey business: Chimps don’t have human rights, philosophers say" Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26671952.post-48165731327297411372018-05-18T12:36:21.359-04:002018-05-18T12:36:21.359-04:00Thanks for the recommendation for Rachels! I order...Thanks for the recommendation for Rachels! I ordered his book ("Created from Animals: Moral Implications of Darwinism") straightaway since it's obviously very applicable to the project I'm building at evphil.com about an "Evolutionary Philosophy". I'm more familiar with Singer's "expanding circle of concern" for extending moral attitudes towards nonhuman animals, and I must admit I'm skeptical of systems that place a heavy emphasis on individuals if there's a cost of not looking at their communitarian bonds, but I'll look at Rachels work in more depth to see if I'm reading too much into that "moral individualism" title.<br /><br />I'm inclined to follow along on the granting of rights to beings with *some kind* of thoughts, feelings, and perceptions — I certainly think we have moral obligations to such beings — but rights are legal constructions and I'm not sure how air tight a legal case we can make for such rights given the philosophical problems we have with air tight cases for free will and consciousness etc. in humans, and the drawing of bright lines necessary for legal judgments is practically impossible for individuals then in my view. (I see you've published on the connections between animal rights and abortion, which is an excellent example of the problems of blurred lines at the margins of what an "individual" is.) I see your points now though and believe you see the ones I wanted to make. I wish you luck in your endeavours and will follow along on your blog now. (My wife found this post from a facebook group she follows.) Cheers!@EdGibneyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07006621927333991236noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26671952.post-66782733231143031362018-05-18T11:24:21.260-04:002018-05-18T11:24:21.260-04:00https://goo.gl/yzoWue<a href="https://goo.gl/yzoWue" rel="nofollow">https://goo.gl/yzoWue</a>Nathan Nobishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12152631338134046080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26671952.post-43699706498560266542018-05-18T11:23:38.785-04:002018-05-18T11:23:38.785-04:00@EdGibney, thanks for your response.
Concerning y...@EdGibney, thanks for your response.<br /><br />Concerning your final question, an answer -- from the initial post - is this:<br /><br />Anyone who is conscious, aware, with *some kind of* thoughts, feelings and perceptions, who can be harmed -- that is, made worse off, from their own point of view -- has some kind of rights. <br /><br />A view like this would apply to the infant and chimpanzee. It can also be applied to the coma patient, if modified to include prior consciousness and feeling, especially if that will return. <br /><br />Concerning individuals and groups, you could investigate an idea called "moral individualism" developed by James Rachels. https://goo.gl/yzoWueNathan Nobishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12152631338134046080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26671952.post-17788635592452201492018-05-18T10:38:28.773-04:002018-05-18T10:38:28.773-04:00Ah good. It seems like you get what I was trying t...Ah good. It seems like you get what I was trying to say on behalf of the "other" side in this.<br /><br />I'm not sure I get your latest point now though. I thought an "individual-focused" view was problematic due to wide differences between the capabilities of individuals. You want to give rights to 5-day old infants right? And comatose car-crash victims? And chimpanzees as well? What is your threshold for granting rights then? I don't see how an individual view alone works by itself. There are just too many exceptions in competence among individuals at any given point in their life histories. And why restrict yourself to an individual view when group views are available and make sense in terms of evolutionary biology?@EdGibneyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07006621927333991236noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26671952.post-28440694272906572252018-05-18T06:59:38.309-04:002018-05-18T06:59:38.309-04:00Thanks, @EdGibney for your thoughts.
Yes, people...Thanks, @EdGibney for your thoughts. <br /><br />Yes, people might think that *universal rights* are granted to *groups*, not individuals, based on qualities within the group, even if some specific qualities are not contained by every member in the group. <br /><br />In reply, I think that's basically just not correct, in light of examples given above, which involve individuals, who are part of the group, who should not be treated like a typical member of the group, given their unique characteristics. And there's no good reason to accept this sort of view, especially since an individual-focused view does a better job. Nathan Nobishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12152631338134046080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26671952.post-45482850321376452212018-05-18T05:25:35.097-04:002018-05-18T05:25:35.097-04:00Oh I agree with your original post and all the arg...Oh I agree with your original post and all the arguments which show you cannot logically use *individual* properties to grant rights to *every individual*, but I don't think that's the only argument being made by non-human animal rights deniers. I think they could say that the *universal rights* are granted to *groups*, not individuals, based on qualities within the group, even if some specific qualities are not contained by every member in the group. I think that is the argument being made by the other side on this, or at least it's a logical one they could make without resorting to god or other ineffable human qualities. Anyone who studies philosophy and biology knows that there aren't perfectly clear methods to "carve nature at its joints", but in the legal world we are forced to do this all the time, and the joint between the human species and other extant species is a clear enough one for legal purposes. That's why I think their reasoning is less problematic than you indicate. It would be logical to me to apply "universal human rights" to a group based on the properties of *most* (loosely defined) members of that group. And it would be logical to deny "universal rights" to a group (e.g. chimpanzees) if absolutely no members of that group *qualify* (again, loosely defined) for those rights. So I don't know if your broader proposal would be accepted by the other side because a "sizeable" percentage is probably too debatable and they will still point to the natural joint between humans and non-human animals as a good place to stop calculating those percentages.<br /><br />Now, however, I also think it's logical for us to then say that since we find it useful to grant rights to all of the individual members of our group *even if* some of those individual members don't fully qualify for them, then it could be equally useful to extend those rights to other individuals outside of our group who may not exhibit all the qualities to earn them. (And by "earn" them, I mean something like an ability to reciprocate the recognition of these rights. No chimps at this stage of evolutionary history could agree to something like a Geneva convention to not tear the arms off of humans in captivity. They may be thinking, feeling, rational, conscious, sentient creatures, but this they cannot do. Even if it may only be because we humans lack the capacity to fully communicate with them.) This ends up being similar to Kant's argument that: "cruelty to animals is contrary to man's duty to himself, because it deadens in him the feeling of sympathy for their sufferings, and thus a natural tendency that is very useful to morality in relation to other human beings is weakened." But I think this sentiment is supported by much greater evidence now from the sciences of evolution and ecology which show our complete interdependence and relation to the rest of nature. Our own survival is dependent on the survival of so much of the rest of life that we ought to enforce a much stronger respect for the rest of life. Widening rights beyond "mere humans" would be a very important step for that.<br /><br />What do you think? Do you see where I think the other side might be coming from on this? And how we can effectively accept their arguments, but then counter them by pointing out their own logic and then extending it further to where we think it must go? It's only a slight addition to your original post, but I do think this "groups" vs. "individual members of the groups" thing must be cleared up.@EdGibneyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07006621927333991236noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26671952.post-9974305267748885342018-05-17T11:18:16.448-04:002018-05-17T11:18:16.448-04:00Thanks for your comment, @EdGibney, but this type ...Thanks for your comment, @EdGibney, but this type of reasoning is likely problematic, for reasons suggested in the original post. Just because a sizable percentage of some group can understand and uphold some properties or requirements to have some right, or to be treated some way, doesn't mean that every member of that group has that right or should be treated that way. (What are some examples to show this?)<br /><br />More interestingly, what about a broader proposal like this? It's the same appealing to groups, but with a broader, more inclusive group:<br /><br />A sizeable percentage of *conscious, sentient beings* can understand and uphold the social contract that gives rights. Rather than test each individual for their ability to "earn" these rights, it has been decided that the contract is much stronger by being applied to any and all *conscious, sentient beings*just by being a member of this group. Nathan Nobishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12152631338134046080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26671952.post-16710749331987796632018-05-17T10:49:01.659-04:002018-05-17T10:49:01.659-04:00I'm very sympathetic to the cause of granting ...I'm very sympathetic to the cause of granting chimpanzees rights, but I don't think we have grasped and rebutted the real argument that is being made on the other side. I would "steel man" their argument by saying something like this: A sizeable percentage of Homo sapiens can understand and uphold the social contract that gives "human rights" for human responsibilities. Rather than test each individual for their ability to "earn" these rights, it has been decided that the contract is much stronger by being applied to any and all Homo sapiens just by dint of being a member of this group of animals. No rocks can ever grasp and understand their duties and obligations, so no rocks are granted rights. No trees can ever grasp and understand their duties and obligations, so no trees are granted rights. Similarly, no chimpanzees can ever grasp and understand their duties and obligations, so no Pan troglodytes are granted rights.<br /><br />I think there is something to said for the "it has been decided that the contract is much stronger" part of the creation of human rights (once called "nonsense on stilts"), and our unspoken contract with life in general could be made stronger by including other forms of life in our social contracts, but we need to say this explicitly. On their own terms, the deniers of chimpanzee rights have a logical case.@EdGibneyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07006621927333991236noreply@blogger.com